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VIEWPOINT
Border Adjustments and the Conservation of Tax Planning
by David M. Schizer
A litigator, a corporate lawyer, and a tax 
lawyer are at a funeral. The eulogy is beautiful, so 
they talk about what they want people to say at 
their funeral. The litigator says, “I hope they say I 
was a staunch advocate for my clients.” The 
corporate lawyer says, “I hope they say that I got 
my clients the best possible deals.” The tax lawyer 
says, “At my funeral, I hope they say three words: 
‘Look, he’s moving.’”
For a long time, tax reform seemed to be dead, 
but now it is moving. This is a real opportunity 
that should not be wasted. This article focuses on 
a part of our tax system that is especially 
dysfunctional: the taxes on public companies and 
their shareholders. Most commentators agree that 
these rules are broken and that the United States 
should not have the highest corporate tax rate in 
the OECD.
But still, we should be precise about what the 
problem actually is. Three concerns are often 
emphasized, but only one of them troubles me. 
First, are we overtaxing U.S. companies? 
Although the 35 percent rate on the books is too 
high, firms usually pay a much lower effective 
rate, which the Government Accountability Office 
estimates as 12.6 percent on average.1
This brings us to the second concern, which 
does trouble me. Taxpayers change their behavior 
in problematic ways to avoid tax. For example, 
corporations shift profits overseas and keep 
trillions of dollars abroad. Would anyone 
deliberately design a tax system that discourages 
businesses from investing in the home country? 
Our system also treats firms in different sectors 
differently. It is a mistake to put a thumb on the 
scale in this way.
A third common concern is that public firms 
are taxed twice. The corporation pays one tax, and 
shareholders pay another. Yet as this article 
explains, this “double tax” should be viewed as a 
feature, not a bug.
So what is the right path forward? Congress 
should follow a three-part strategy. First, 
Congress should trade a low corporate rate for 
strict limits on familiar planning strategies. In this 
grand bargain, Congress should give U.S. 
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In this article, Schizer 
argues that U.S. corporate and shareholder 
taxes need to be reformed, and the corporate 
rate should be much lower. In reforming this 
dysfunctional regime, according to Schizer,  
Congress should keep both of these taxes as a 
form of built-in redundancy; if one tax is 
avoided, the other can still be collected. More 
generally, Congress should be wary of Utopian 
solutions. Tax reform is more likely to change 
tax planning than to eliminate it entirely, 
Schizer concludes. For instance, although 
border adjustments would foreclose some 
strategies, they would encourage others.
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alone, and do not express the views of any 
institutions with which he is affiliated.
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1
GAO, “Corporate Income Tax: Effective Tax Rates Can Differ 
Significantly From the Statutory Rate,” GAO-13-520, at 14 (2013).
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companies the low rate they want, and should 
demand in return that they actually pay it.
Second, although fundamental change can be 
appealing, it should not be oversold. For example, 
advocates of border adjustments — which would 
tax imports and exempt exports — say this reform 
would allow the United States to have a high 
corporate rate, because a border-adjusted tax 
supposedly cannot be avoided.2 But this is not the 
case. It is more accurate to say that a border-
adjusted tax, such as the one proposed by House 
Republicans,3 cannot be avoided with strategies 
that currently are pervasive, such as aggressive 
transfer pricing. But there will be new strategies. 
Although border adjustments would solve some 
problems, they would create others.
I am reminded of Antoine Lavoisier’s Law of 
Conservation of Mass. He showed that mass is 
neither created nor destroyed in a chemical 
reaction; it just changes. This article offers an 
analogous principle: Schizer’s Law of 
Conservation of Tax Planning. Planning is not 
eliminated in tax reform; it just changes.
So how should we respond to ever-shifting 
planning? The answer is the third component of 
the strategy that Congress should follow: base 
diversification. Congress should not rely on only 
one tax. Because every approach to taxing 
businesses has flaws, Congress should use more 
than one. Specifically, in addition to taxing 
corporations, Congress should continue to tax 
shareholders on dividends and capital gains.4
I. Advantages of Using Two Taxes Instead of One
Does it really matter whether Congress uses 
two taxes or one? At first blush, this seems 
unimportant. In taxing either corporations or 
shareholders, isn’t Congress just taking money 
from one pocket instead of the other?
A. Different Planning: Firms and Shareholders
In fact, corporate and shareholder taxes are 
not interchangeable. Because these regimes 
define income differently, planning to avoid them 
is not the same. Therefore, corporations use one 
set of strategies, while shareholders use another. 
Repealing one tax avoids the distortions from that 
tax, but the other tax’s distortions still remain. As 
a result, choosing which tax to impose is like 
navigating between Scylla and Charybdis.5 Each 
causes distortions, and Congress is stuck with one 
set or the other.
To prove the point, let’s start with two familiar 
ways to avoid a high corporate tax. The first is 
income shifting — earning income in jurisdictions 
with a low corporate rate. Estimates suggest the 
United States could be losing as much as one-
third of its corporate tax revenue because of 
income shifting. Also, because sectors vary in 
their ability to shift income, the different effective 
tax rates across sectors distort capital allocation. 
Congress actually could solve these problems by 
repealing (or cutting) the corporate tax and 
replacing it with a higher shareholder tax. If the 
United States no longer has a corporate tax, firms 
would have no reason to shift income out of the 
United States. Notably, a high shareholder tax 
would not encourage firms to shift income. As 
long as shareholders are citizens or residents of 
the United States, they have to pay U.S. tax on 
dividends and capital gains, regardless of where 
the underlying corporate income was earned.
A second familiar response to a high U.S. 
corporate rate is that U.S. corporations change 
their tax residence to become foreign 
corporations. In doing so, they avoid U.S. tax on 
foreign earnings. As long as we have a high 
corporate tax rate, inversions are hard to stop, at 
least if Congress wants to allow cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions that aren’t tax 
motivated. But if the corporate tax is eliminated or 
cut substantially, and this cut is funded with an 
increase in the shareholder tax, inversions would 
lose their appeal. A high shareholder tax won’t 
motivate taxpayers to do inversions — U.S. 
shareholders would still pay tax on dividends and 
2
Alan Auerbach et al., “Destination-Based Cash Flow Taxation,” 
Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation Working Paper 17/01, at 
35 (Jan. 27, 2017).
3
Tax Reform Task Force, “A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident 
America” (June 24, 2016) (blueprint).
4
For a more comprehensive discussion of this idea, see David M. 
Schizer, “Between Scylla and Charybdis: Taxing Corporations or 
Shareholders (or Both),” 116 Col. L. Rev. 1849 (Nov. 2016).
5
In The Odyssey, the Greeks had to sail between a man-eating monster 
(Scylla) and a deadly whirlpool (Charybdis).
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capital gains, whether they invest in U.S. or 
foreign firms.
To deter income shifting and inversions, 
therefore, Congress might be tempted to repeal 
(or cut) the corporate tax and replace the revenue 
with a higher shareholder tax. Although that 
would solve those problems, Congress would face 
a different set of familiar problems as taxpayers 
seek to avoid shareholder taxes.
First, to avoid capital gains tax, shareholders 
could simply choose not to sell their stock. If they 
die holding it, or if they contribute it to charity, 
they would never pay tax on any appreciation in 
their shares. Second, firms could stop paying 
dividends. Indeed, if the tax rate inside the 
corporation is lower than the tax rate outside the 
firm (for example, the personal rate), money 
would grow faster inside, so taxpayers would not 
want to take it out. The corporation would 
function like an IRA. Third, under current law, 
tax-exempt shareholders do not pay dividend and 
capital gains taxes, while foreigners usually pay a 
reduced rate on dividends and pay no tax on 
capital gains. This is a significant issue, 
because estimates suggest that 75 percent of U.S. 
equities are held by tax-exempt and foreign 
shareholders.6 An advantage of the corporate tax 
is that it reaches these shareholders indirectly (by 
taxing their share of a firm’s earnings at the 
corporate level).
So to sum up: If we repeal the corporate tax 
and rely only on a high shareholder tax, firms 
would retain more earnings, and shareholders 
would defer selling stock. Tax-exempt and foreign 
shareholders would no longer pay tax indirectly 
through the corporate tax. To solve these 
problems, we could go back to the other end of the 
spectrum, eliminating the shareholder tax and 
relying only on the corporate tax. But then 
corporations would shift income abroad and 
change their tax residence. So we are navigating 
between Scylla and Charybdis. What should we 
do?
B. Tax Base Diversification
The answer is to keep both taxes. Initially, this 
may seem like a counterintuitive claim. If both 
taxes are distortive, isn’t it better to get rid of at 
least one? It seems odd to contend that each tax is 
so flawed that we really need them both. But in 
fact, we need to diversify the tax base for three 
reasons.
The first is built-in redundancy. Engineers 
often rely on two systems, instead of one, for 
critical functions. In this spirit, an advantage of 
having two taxes is that if one is avoided, the other 
can still apply. For instance, when corporations 
avoid corporate tax by shifting income, 
shareholders still have to pay tax when they sell 
appreciated stock. Likewise, even if dividend and 
capital gains taxes do not reach tax-exempt 
shareholders, the corporate tax still taxes them 
indirectly.
A second reason to use both taxes is that 
repealing one of them is an overreaction. To deal 
with the distortions a tax causes, a rate cut often is 
sufficient. For instance, to stop income shifting, 
the corporate rate does not have to be 0 percent. 
Rather, 15 percent could be low enough because 
tax planning is not free. Taxpayers have to pay 
advisers and make changes that otherwise are not 
appealing. Given these costs, taxpayers will 
simply pay the tax if the rate is low enough.
Third, repealing a tax is not only an 
overreaction, but also a missed opportunity. After 
all, the government would like at least some 
revenue from the tax. Without this revenue, the 
other tax has to be even higher, and thus more 
distortive. For instance, if Congress does not 
collect any tax from corporations, it must collect 
even more tax from shareholders, which makes 
shareholders even more motivated to avoid 
dividend and capital gains taxes.
II. Balancing Corporate and Shareholder Taxes
In taxing both corporations and shareholders, 
Congress should coordinate the two taxes so that 
in the aggregate, Congress collects the combined 
rate that it wants. Ideally, the combined rate 
should equal the rate for passthrough businesses 
so taxpayers do not have a tax reason to favor one 
business form over the other.6Steven M. Rosenthal and Lydia S. Austin, “The Dwindling Taxable 
Share of U.S. Corporate Stock,” Tax Notes, May 16, 2016, p. 923 
(estimating that taxable accounts held only 24.2 percent of U.S. equity in 
2015).
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A. Cutting the Corporate Rate
In addition to picking the right combined rate, 
Congress has to decide how to apportion this 
burden between corporations and shareholders. 
In striking that balance, Congress should use a 
lower rate for the more distortive tax. In my view, 
the corporate tax is especially distortive, so a 35 
percent corporate rate is much too high. A 20 
percent rate would be an improvement, and a 15 
percent rate would be even better. To fund this 
cut, Congress should consider increasing the 
dividend and capital gains rate or, at least, not 
cutting that rate (which is now approximately 20 
percent).
B. Shoring Up the Shareholder Tax
In deciding how high the shareholder rate can 
be — and, thus, how much the corporate rate can 
be cut — Congress should consider targeted 
reforms to make the shareholder tax less porous. 
Strategies for avoiding the shareholder tax are 
well understood, so a detailed discussion of 
reforms to plug these gaps is beyond this article’s 
scope. But a few ideas should be mentioned 
briefly.
First, tax-exempt shareholders pay no 
dividend and capital gains tax, but are taxed 
indirectly through the corporate tax.7 If Congress 
cuts this indirect tax, the lost revenue could be 
replaced with a new, direct tax. For example, 
Congress could impose a modest new tax of 10 
percent on dividends and capital gains of tax-
exempt shareholders.8
Second, as noted above, shareholders can 
avoid capital gains tax either by holding 
appreciated stock until they die or by contributing 
it to charity. To foreclose these planning 
opportunities, Congress could repeal the step-up 
in basis at death. Likewise, Congress could limit 
the charitable deduction for appreciated stock to 
the shareholder’s basis.
Third, Congress could target this deferral with 
more ambitious reforms, such as mark-to-market 
accounting for publicly traded shares or an 
interest charge when shareholders sell. The 
advantages and challenges of these reforms are 
well understood, so they are not considered here.9
C. Shoring Up the Corporate Tax
Shoring up the corporate tax obviously would 
be desirable so that Congress would not rely 
solely on a rate cut to discourage avoidance of that 
tax. For instance, one familiar way to avoid the 
corporate tax is to capitalize the corporation with 
debt, because interest payments are deductible. 
To block this strategy, Congress could repeal (or 
limit) the interest deduction. For instance, the 
House plan would eliminate the deduction for net 
interest payments.10
Repealing the interest deduction would offer the 
important advantage of relying on two taxes instead 
of one. As long as a corporation can deduct interest 
payments, it is never taxed on the revenue funding 
these payments; instead, only the lender is taxed. 
For example, assume a firm earns $100, and uses it 
to pay $100 of interest to creditors. If the firm can 
deduct this $100 payment, it pays no tax. Instead, the 
lenders pay tax on $100 of interest income. This 
approach does not offer built-in redundancy. If 
lenders are tax exempt or foreign, U.S. tax is never 
collected on that revenue.
In contrast, if the interest deduction is 
repealed, tax would be collected from both the 
corporation and its lenders. For instance, if 
Congress wants a combined tax of 36.5 percent, it 
could reduce the corporate rate to 15 percent, 
repeal the interest deduction, and tax both interest 
and dividend income at the same 25 percent rate. 
Under this new system, a business’s revenue 
generally would be subject to the same rate,11 
regardless of whether the business is capitalized 
7
To an extent, the incidence of the corporate tax may be on labor or 
consumers, instead of shareholders.
8
While subsidies for charity are important, the deduction for 
charitable contributions arguably is a more effective subsidy than the 
exemption of a charity’s investment income. See Schizer, “Subsidies and 
Nonprofit Governance: Comparing the Charitable Deduction With the 
Exemption for Endowment Income,” Columbia Law and Economics 
Working Paper No. 558 (Feb. 10, 2017).
9
For a more complete discussion, see Schizer, supra note 4, at 1891-
1896.
10
Blueprint, supra note 3, at 26 (“Under this Blueprint, job creators 
will be allowed to deduct interest expense against any interest income, 
but no current deduction will be allowed for net interest expense.”).
11
If the firm earns $100 and pays $15 in tax, investors receive $85. 
After paying a 25 percent tax of $21.25, they have $63.75.
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with debt or equity.12 Obviously, there would be 
built-in redundancy. Also, because intercompany 
lending is often used to shift income to low-tax 
jurisdictions, repealing the interest deduction 
would make income shifting more difficult.
III. Border Adjustments
Yet even if firms could no longer use 
intercompany debt to shift income, they could still 
use other familiar strategies, such as transfers of 
intellectual property and aggressive transfer 
pricing.13 While commentators have considered a 
number of responses to these strategies over the 
years, the House plan proposes a somewhat novel 
one — border adjustments14 — which treat 
exports and imports differently.
Under a tax with border adjustments, a U.S. 
firm that exports goods or services could deduct 
its costs, but would pay no tax on export revenue. 
For example, if Exportco pays $60 to manufacture 
widgets in New York, and sells them for $100 in 
London, Exportco would have a $60 deduction 
and no taxable income.
In contrast, a U.S. firm that imports goods 
would pay tax in selling them in the U.S. market, 
but could not deduct the cost of these goods. For 
instance, if Importco buys gidgets in London for 
$60 and sells them in New York for $100, Importco 
would have $100 of taxable income and could not 
deduct its $60 cost.
Although border adjustments are a common 
feature of VATs, they have not generally been 
used in corporate taxes. Even so, House 
Republicans have included border adjustments in 
the destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT) they 
have proposed. Border adjustments are a clear 
example of the Law of Conservation of Tax 
Planning. Although they would solve some 
problems, they would create others.
A. Advantages of Border Adjustments
On the positive side of the ledger, border 
adjustments would reduce the appeal of shifting a 
U.S. firm’s income abroad and of changing its 
corporate residence. Border adjustments would 
allow Congress to score additional revenue. 
Congress also could take an ambiguous position 
on trade policy, which could appeal to supporters 
with competing views.
1. Income shifting.
Border adjustments obviously would change 
the tax rules for cross-border activity. The key 
issue would no longer be where economic value is 
created, but where that value is consumed.
Under current law, whether economic value is 
created in the United States or abroad is an 
important question. For example, assume a U.S. 
high-tech firm holds IP and a foreign 
manufacturing facility in a foreign subsidiary. 
This subsidiary sells smartphones to a U.S. 
subsidiary for $95 each, which sells them to U.S. 
consumers for $100. Under current law, although 
the $5 markup is taxed currently in the United 
States, the $95 of value created overseas generally 
is not. U.S. tax is deferred until the foreign 
subsidiary distributes this cash to its U.S. parent. 
Therefore, by generating economic value offshore 
and not bringing back the cash, U.S. firms can 
defer U.S. tax indefinitely. U.S. multinationals 
currently keep approximately $2.5 trillion of 
untaxed earnings overseas.15
In contrast, if border adjustments are 
introduced, the full $100 purchase price paid by a 
U.S. consumer would be taxed in the United 
States. In selling imported goods to U.S. 
consumers, a U.S. firm could not deduct the cost 
of an import (that is, the $95 paid to the foreign 
affiliate). So moving production offshore — by 
moving real activities or using planning strategies 
— would not reduce the U.S. firm’s tax bill 
anymore.16 On the contrary, the firm would be 
better off with domestic production because the 
costs would be deductible. This is a significant 
advantage of border adjustments, because income 
shifting is difficult to stop under current law.
12
If tax-exempts were subject to a 10 percent tax on interest and 
dividends from C corporations, the combined rate for these investors 
would be 23.5 percent. If the firm earns $100 of revenue and pays $15 of 
tax, the tax-exempt investors receive $85. After paying $8.50 in tax, the 
tax-exempts have $76.50.
13
For a more complete discussion, see Schizer, supra note 4, at 1897-
1901.
14
Blueprint, supra note 3, at 27.
15
Jeff Cox, “U.S. Companies Are Hoarding $2.5 Trillion in Cash 
Overseas,” CNBC Finance, Sept. 20, 2016.
16
Auerbach et al., supra note 2, at 30-32.
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A justification for border adjustments, then, is 
that firms could not move consumption abroad as 
easily as they currently shift production. Because 
the United States has the largest and most 
profitable consumer market in the world, firms 
would still want access to that market, even if they 
have to pay U.S. tax in order to do business there. 
With border adjustments, firms also would no 
longer have a tax reason to avoid repatriating 
cash.
2. Inversions.
Just as border adjustments would eliminate 
the advantage of shifting production, they would 
eliminate the advantage of shifting corporate 
residence. Under current law, the tech company 
described above has an incentive to become a 
foreign firm so the tax on its foreign earnings 
would be eliminated, instead of merely deferred, 
because foreign firms are taxed only on their U.S. 
earnings, while U.S. firms are taxable on their 
worldwide income (although they can defer tax 
on foreign earnings).
Again, border adjustments would eliminate 
this difference — sales to U.S. consumers are 
supposed to be taxed, regardless of where the 
seller is incorporated. As a result, corporate 
inversions would lose their U.S. tax advantage.17
3. Extra tax revenue from a trade deficit.
Some supporters of border adjustments also 
emphasize the extra revenue the system would 
raise. Because U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports, 
the tax revenue picked up from taxing imports 
would exceed the revenue lost from exempting 
exports. Given the size of the U.S. trade deficit, 
introducing border adjustments is estimated to 
raise more than $1 trillion dollars over 10 years.18 
Of course, this number could change if the trade 
gap narrows, which is a goal of the Trump 
administration. But as a matter of fiscal 
accounting — which has political significance in 
tax reform — the fact that Congress can score this 
revenue is a political advantage of border 
adjustments.
4. Ambiguous impact on trade.
Border adjustments can benefit from another 
political head wind as well. Because they tax 
imports and exempt exports, they seem to favor 
domestic production and exports over imports. 
President Trump’s campaign endorsed this sort of 
trade policy, so the administration might 
ultimately accept border adjustments as part of its 
trade strategy (although they have not endorsed 
border adjustments so far, as the House of 
Representatives has).
Yet in theory, border adjustments actually 
should not favor exports and domestic 
production over imports because exchange rates 
are supposed to adjust to offset any difference in 
tax treatment.19
Specifically, if U.S. exports become more 
competitive — because no U.S. tax is imposed on 
them — foreign buyers should begin buying more 
U.S. exports. To do so, they would need U.S. 
dollars. But as more foreigners buy dollars, the 
dollar’s value should rise. A more expensive 
dollar would weaken the competitive position of 
U.S. exports. As a result, this currency adjustment 
would offset the tax cut for exports.20
The mirror image should happen for imports. 
Border adjustments initially would make imports 
less competitive, because U.S. tax would apply to 
them (with no deductions for the cost of 
producing them). As a result, U.S. consumers 
should begin buying fewer imports and thus 
would have less demand for foreign currencies. In 
response, these currencies would become 
cheaper, which should reduce the dollar price of 
imports,21 making them more competitive. This 
17
Id. at 32.
18
David S. Miller, “How Donald Trump Can Keep His Campaign 
Promises,” Tax Notes, May 22, 2017, p. 1105 (Part 1), and May 29, 2017, p. 
1305 (Part 2).
19
Auerbach et al., supra note 2, at 19-23.
20
For example, assume a U.S. tech company sells smartphones 
abroad. The exchange rate is $1 per euro, and the firm wants to sell the 
phones in Europe for $100 (and, thus, for €100). Assume then that border 
adjustments are enacted, so the tech company no longer has to pay a 25 
percent tax. As a result, the company can charge only $80, instead of 
$100, making U.S. exports more competitive. In response, European 
consumers buy more dollars. If the dollar’s value increases by 25 percent 
— so $1 equals €1.25 — the $80 phone again costs €100. In other words, a 
25 percent tax cut is perfectly offset by a 25 percent increase in the dollar.
21
For example, assume a U.S. importer sells French wine in the 
United States. The exchange rate begins at €1 per dollar. This means a 
€100 bottle of wine sells for $100. If border adjustments are 
implemented, the U.S. firm can no longer deduct the cost of this import, 
and thus must pay a 25 percent tax. This means the cost is now €125. But 
this higher price reduces the demand for imports. If the euro weakens by 
25 percent, so a euro now costs only 80 cents, a €125 bottle of wine would 
again sell for $100.
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currency adjustment would offset the tax 
disadvantage of imports.
In other words, if border adjustments lead to a 
stronger dollar, this shift in exchange rates should 
reduce — and, in theory, fully offset — the 
advantage that border adjustments would 
otherwise create for exports over imports. A key 
question, considered below, is whether exchange 
rates actually would adjust fully. If they do, 
border adjustments would not favor exports and 
domestic production over imports. As a result, the 
tilt away from imports would be more symbolic 
than real. This actually could be a political 
advantage for those who do not really want to 
discourage imports but need to gesture in that 
direction for political reasons.
B. Problems With Border Adjustments
The advantages described above — and, in 
particular, the fact that income shifting and 
inversions would lose much of their appeal — are 
significant. But border adjustments should not be 
oversold. Because border adjustments would 
solve these problems, some advocates imply that 
they would solve all problems. Specifically, they 
claim that border adjustments would eliminate 
the pressure on countries to cut their corporate tax 
rates:
The pressure to have a low rate of tax in 
order to compete with neighbouring 
countries disappears when all adopt a 
DBCFT, since . . . location decisions by 
business should be independent of the 
rates at which each levies its DBCFT. Each 
country could therefore raise its tax rate 
without fearing an exodus of either real 
economic activity or taxable profit.22
This is too optimistic. Even though border 
adjustments shut down some planning strategies, 
they create new ones.
To be clear, the goal here is not to say that 
border adjustments are fatally flawed, but to 
make two points. First, if Congress wants to enact 
border adjustments, these issues need to be 
addressed in order to head off unintended 
consequences. Second, in a tax with border 
adjustments, the corporate rate remains 
important. Border adjustments are not a magic 
bullet to allow countries to have as high a rate as 
they want. There would still be competitive 
pressures to cut the corporate rate — something 
the United States has to do. But in a border-
adjusted system, these competitive pressures 
would manifest themselves differently.
1. Direct sales by foreign businesses to U.S. 
consumers.
A border-adjusted tax is supposed to reach 
imports. While the logistics are straightforward 
when a U.S. firm imports goods and sells them to 
U.S. consumers, the logistics become more 
difficult when U.S. consumers buy directly from 
foreign firms.
To see this problem, let’s start with the easier 
case in which the importer is a U.S. firm instead of 
a U.S. consumer. For example, assume a U.S. tech 
firm pays $95 to a foreign firm for smartphones 
and sells them for $100 to U.S. consumers. With 
border adjustments, the U.S. tech firm pays tax on 
$100, without deducting the $95 cost.
However, this result becomes much harder to 
achieve if consumers buy directly from a foreign 
firm.23 Under U.S. treaties, a foreign firm does not 
pay tax in the United States unless it has a 
sufficient presence — a so-called permanent 
establishment — in the United States. Online 
sales, for instance, would not qualify. Unless the 
United States renegotiates 68 treaties, or imposes 
a new excise tax directly on consumers, these 
goods would not be taxed.
Unless this issue is addressed, it could become 
a gaping hole in the tax base; indeed, tax could be 
avoided not only on imports, but also on 
domestically produced goods. For example, 
assume a U.S. tech company pays $40 to produce 
smartphones in the United States and sells them 
to an independent foreign firm for $99. Under a 
border-adjusted system, the U.S. firm would 
deduct $40 and would not be taxed on $99 of 
revenue, which is from an export. Assume the 
foreign firm uses a website to make online sales to 
U.S. consumers for $100 (that is, the foreign seller 
is an independent agent with no U.S. PE). Unless 
treaties are renegotiated or an excise tax is 
22
Auerbach et al., supra note 2.
23
Miller, supra note 18, Part 1, at 1115-1116.
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imposed, these goods — produced in the United 
States and eventually sold to U.S. consumers — 
would not be subject to U.S. tax. The “round trip” 
through a foreign agent eliminates the tax.24
Obviously, round trips are more appealing if 
the corporate rate is high. As a result, the tax rate 
would remain relevant in a system with border 
adjustments. Also, base diversification would 
continue to be important. If firms could avoid 
corporate tax by interposing a foreign agent, 
Congress would have all the more reason to tax 
the firm’s shareholders, because dividend and 
capital gains taxes would not depend on whether 
profits were generated through exports or 
imports. In other words, even with border 
adjustments, two key recommendations of this 
article — built-in redundancy and a lower 
corporate rate — would still be necessary.
2. Defining an export.
Second, if exports are not taxed, U.S. firms 
obviously would want to classify goods and 
services as exports. As a result, more nuanced 
source rules would be needed to define exports. In 
principle, the test would presumably ask where a 
good or service is purchased. But is the key 
question where payment is made, where the good 
or service is used, or where the buyer’s legal 
residence is?
As examples of the conceptual and practical 
challenges that would arise in this sort of inquiry, 
consider legal services and investment advice. 
Under current law, services are sourced based on 
where the service provider is. But in a destination-
based system, the focus might instead be on 
where the client is. So what happens if a U.S. law 
firm provides legal services to a multinational 
incorporated in the Cayman Islands whose 
markets are in Europe and the United States, 
whose CEO is in New York, and whose general 
counsel is in London? Is this legal advice a tax-free 
export? Similarly, what if an asset manager living 
in Connecticut works for an asset management 
firm incorporated in Bermuda that has Asian 
investors? Is the asset manager’s advice — and the 
management fee she earns (for example, 20 
percent of profits) — an export?
Depending on the precise shape the rule 
ultimately takes, there could well be ways to treat 
these high-value activities as tax-free exports.25 
Again, the motivation to do so would be greater if 
the tax rate is high.
3. Exporters as tax accommodation parties.
A third planning strategy in a border-adjusted 
system, which David Miller has emphasized, is 
that exporters would become tax accommodation 
parties.26 Because their U.S. costs would still be 
deductible, but their export income would be tax 
free, their exports would generate tax losses. 
Exporters obviously would be motivated to use 
these losses. For instance, they might merge with 
firms that have positive U.S. income or hold 
passive assets whose income would be sheltered.
Also, exporters might position themselves as 
trade intermediaries, buying imported goods and 
immediately selling them to importers. For 
example, if a U.S. tech firm exports phones to 
Europe, it would have deductions for the cost of 
producing phones, but no income from these 
exports. To use these deductions, the tech firm 
could buy wine from French wineries and 
immediately resell it to U.S. wine distributors. 
Because the phone manufacturer could not claim 
a deduction for the cost of this wine, which is 
imported, it would have taxable income in selling 
wine to U.S. wineries (which would be sheltered 
by deductions from its phone business). This 
helps the wine distributors, who would then have 
tax basis in the wine, because they would buy it 
from a U.S. firm (the phone manufacturer), 
instead of from a foreign producer. In this 
hypothetical, there obviously would be no 
business reason for a phone manufacturer to 
become a wine importer, but border adjustments 
would create a tax incentive to intermediate in 
this way. Again, the higher the tax rate, the more 
appealing this planning strategy would become.
4. Tax-free exports and the benefits principle.
Although the idea of exempting exports is 
inherent in a destination-based system with border 
24
Under the OECD’s approach to VATs, the question whether a sale is 
an export generally depends on a “nominal customer,” without regard 
to the possibility of resale.
25
Miller, supra note 18, Part 1, at 1120-1121.
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Id. at 1120, 1121.
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adjustments, the case for forgoing tax on exports is 
debatable. In creating this economic value, firms 
benefit from services provided by the U.S. 
government. Under a “benefits theory” of taxation, 
these firms should share in the cost of those services.
Also, if the United States does not tax exports, 
other countries are likely to exert taxing 
jurisdiction over this activity. So the result might 
not be tax-free activity, but a transfer of taxing 
jurisdiction to other countries.
Moreover, even if Congress is willing to cede 
taxing jurisdiction for some exports, the analysis 
might be different for particular types of exports, 
such as oil and gas produced in the United States. 
Because the home country usually taxes the 
export of energy and other extractive industry 
products, the United States may want to adhere to 
this global practice.
5. WTO rules and retaliatory tariffs.
The House Republicans’ proposal may violate 
WTO rules.27 These rules do not permit less 
favorable treatment for imports. The issue with 
the House proposal is that it allows wage costs to 
be deducted for domestically produced goods, 
but not for imports.28 If the WTO finds a trade 
violation, other countries are likely to introduce 
retaliatory tariffs on U.S. goods.
6. Different treatment for different sectors.
As noted above, if the dollar fully adjusts, the 
competitive position of imports and exports 
should not be affected by border adjustments. But 
there are at least two reasons why the dollar might 
not fully adjust (or, at least, why the adjustment 
could take time). First, the dollar is the world’s 
reserve currency, so its value reflects a broad 
range of factors, of which border adjustments 
would be only one.
Second, the exchange rate could fully offset a tax 
only if the tax is imposed at a single rate. But the 
House proposal actually would not apply a single 
rate to the entire economy, because different rates 
are proposed for C corporations (for example, 
public companies) and passthrough entities (for 
example, partnerships). Because the exchange rate 
could fully offset only one of these tax rates, it could 
not offset border adjustments for every firm.
If the dollar does not fully adjust, border 
adjustments would in fact undercut the 
competitive position of imports and would give 
an advantage to exports (unless retaliatory tariffs 
are introduced). As a result, border adjustments 
would favor companies that generate exports (for 
example, high tech) over those that rely on 
imports (for example, retail). These differences 
across sectors could distort capital allocation.
To sum up, border adjustments are an intriguing 
idea, but not a magic bullet. Although they solve 
some problems, they create others. In response to 
this trade-off, a plausible approach is to develop 
responses to the challenges described above so 
Congress could reap the benefits of border 
adjustments while managing the costs. 
Alternatively, another plausible approach is to 
abandon border adjustments, on the theory that the 
complexity and the risk of unintended 
consequences are too daunting. Either way, a low 
corporate tax rate is still needed, and collecting tax 
from both corporations and shareholders is still 
advisable.
IV. Conclusion
In the coming months, Congress has an 
opportunity to fix our dysfunctional system for 
taxing public companies and their shareholders. 
Our corporate rate is too high, so it prompts all 
sorts of distortions. Congress ends up collecting a 
much lower effective rate, and firms change their 
behavior in undesirable ways to reduce their tax 
bills.
But the fact that we can do better doesn’t 
mean we will do better. Congress should be wary 
of utopian solutions that claim to solve all 
problems. Even as reforms fix some glitches, 
they are likely to create new ones. So Congress 
should keep our tax base diversified by taxing 
both corporations and shareholders. Congress 
should reduce the corporate rate substantially, 
entering into a grand bargain to trade low rates 
for tougher rules that shut down familiar 
planning strategies. Fixing these flaws in our 
system is hard work. But if we can muster the 
political will to do it, we will have a better tax 
system and a brighter economic future. That 
would be an historic achievement. 
27
Id. at 1118.
28
Notably, this issue does not arise for VATs, because they do not 
allow a deduction for wages. As a result, border adjustments are quite 
common in VATs and do not violate WTO rules.
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